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Abstract
Transition from socialist to market economy brought drastic changes to the
Hungarian labour market. Employment fell by 1.6 million, i.e., by more than
25% during the early transition period, while unemployment jumped from
practically nil to over 14% within four years. The rapid economic growth of
the recent years could only create relatively few jobs, even though the unem-
ployment rate continuously declined, and is less than 6% since 2001.
This paper describes labour adjustment after the transitional recession, and
its relationship to corporate efficiency during the recovery period, based on
a panel of medium-sized and large Hungarian firms. Labour demand is also
related to firm level productive efficiency.
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1. Introduction
The fast emergence of large-scale unemployment was probably the most striking macroe-
conomic indicator of transition from socialist to market economy in Hungary, similarly
to most transition economies. When the labour market was liberalized (together with
most aspects of economic activities) unemployment jumped from practically nil to over
14% (February 1993) within four years; gradually declining ever since. Open unemploy-
ment, however, was only one component of the decline in employment. Employment
fell by 1.6m, i.e., by more than 25% in the decade between 1987 and 1996. Only a
small proportion of this drop can be explained by demographic factors. There were
three major exit routes from the labour market: (frequently early) retirement, unem-
ployment and inactivity. Even though unemployment rate fell below 6% in 2001, the
relatively fast economic growth of the past five years1 has only created approximately
one hundred thousand jobs (cumulative). Thus, there still are many inactive people,
who would want to work if jobs were available. And substantial job creation will be
necessary for just maintaining the present rate of unemployment in the forthcoming
years. Few people will retire, as most people in that age bracket took early retirement
years ago, and as the expansion of the higher education has substantially slowed down,
thus, the temporary drop in the number of young people entering the labour market is
largely over.
There is a broad consensus in the literature that centrally planned economies
achieved full employment at the cost of substantial labour hoarding at the firm level.
Kornai [1980] gives a detailed description of the mechanisms leading to excess labour
demand in a socialist economy. Ko¨llo˝ [1998] and Lehmann and Schaffer [1995] give two
alternative theoretical models of corporate labour demand in reformed socialism.
The 1980’s was a period of slow liberalization of many aspects of the economy in
Hungary, including labour markets. This liberalization process was greatly accelerated
first in 1987-8, second in 1989-90. Labour market liberalization was linked to sub-
stantial liberalization of prices, foreign trade, and capital markets, thus firms suddenly
faced a very strong competitive pressure. They no longer had any incentive to hoard
under-utilised (mostly low-skilled) labour. The collapse of former protected markets
and the increased competition lead to a transitional recession in 1990-2. Many firms
went bankrupt, or were liquidated in the process. Many surviving firms shed labour on
a large scale, especially those losing market share.
1 GDP growth rate has been above 4% in all years after 1996.
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Consolidation after the transitional recession started in 1992. The process was ac-
companied by a substantial restructuring of the corporate sector. Privatisation was an
important ingredient of this restructuring; and major Hungarian firms were frequently
sold to foreign investors, usually to multinational companies. Thus, foreign ownership
became dominant by the end of this consolidation period in 1996. Successful restruc-
turing brought about economic growth: the annual GDP growth rate has been above
4% in each year since 1997, with a rapid expansion of manufacturing production and
exports. Aggregate employment decreased throughout the consolidation period, and it
only started to increase in 1997.
The government decided to double the minimum wage in two years time (2001-2),
which, taking account of expected inflation and changes in social security contribution,
amounts to an approximate 75% real increase of labour cost of the cheapest employment.
Even though there were few people employed at minimum wage at the firms in our
sample in 1999 (there were much more such employees at family firms and other micro
enterprises), the wage of approximately 20% of workers at these firms was below the
1999 value of the proposed 2002 threshold in 1999. By effectively raising the cost of
unskilled labour, the government risks to halt the rather paltry job creation of the past
few years, at least for some important groups of employees. Obviously, the expected
effect of the minimum wage increase does not only depend on the wage distribution, it
crucially hinges on the elasticity of labour demand with respect to labour cost.
This paper attempts to identify the major variables influencing corporate labour
demand, including the relationship between productive efficiency and labour demand.
Several important groups of firms are also analysed separately. The sample period of
this study is the post-recession period: 1992-9.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives a brief survey of the
literature on Hungarian labour markets. Section 3 outlines the labour demand models
and discusses the theoretical assumptions behind. Estimation results are analysed in
Section 4. Section 5 extends the production model to incorporate labour adjustment.
Section 6 concludes. Appendix A gives definitions, Appendix B describes the dataset,
while the relevant estimation results are collected in Appendix C.
2. Literature on the Hungarian labour markets
The changes in the Hungarian labour market have been extensively analysed from the
supply side and from the point of view of the (would be) employees (c.f., Bardasi et
al [1999], Galasi and Kertesi [1996], Galasi and Nagy [1999], Kertesi and Ko¨llo˝ [1995],
[1996], [1999], [2000], [2001a], Ko¨llo˝ [2001], Ko¨llo˝ and Nagy [1996], or Micklewright
and Nagy [1996], [1998], and [1999]). Several studies documented that while the
slow liberalization phase of the 1980’s already brought about substantial changes in
the income distribution and in the relative labour market position of various groups of
employees, individual strategies on the labour market only changed substantially from
the early 1990’s with the emergence of large-scale unemployment.
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The other side of the labour market, the demand of the firms has been much less
extensively studied, with the notable exceptions of Basu et al. [1997], Estrin and Svejnar
[1998] and some works by Ja´nos Ko¨llo˝, the most recent of which are Ko¨llo˝ [1998] and
Kertesi and Ko¨llo˝ [2001]. Unfortunately, Basu et al. [1997] and Estrin and Svejnar
[1998] use a very limited dataset on Hungary, and mostly concentrate on the Czech and
Slovak Republics. The analysis of the Hungarian labour market is especially marginal
in Basu et al. [1997].2 The analysis in Ko¨llo˝ [1998] is also hampered by data problems:
his dataset only consists of observations from every third year.
Ko˝ro¨si [1997] estimated dynamic labour demand equations for large exporting firms
in years 1987-95, which included early transition (1987-8), high transition (1989-92),
and recovery (1992-5) periods. Adjustment cost proved to be asymmetric, especially
in the high transition period. It was found that both output, and especially wage
elasticities were extremely high (in absolute terms) during the high transition period,
and downwards elasticities were much larger than upwards elasticities in most years.
Foreign-owned companies had relatively more stable and less extreme behaviour than
other firms.
Halpern and Ko˝ro¨si [1998a] studied, how the labour market position of the firms
influenced profitability. This paper looks at the opposite relationship, how firm level
productive efficiency influences labour market behaviour, if at all.
3. Labour demand models
The base model of our analysis is the following dynamic labour demand equation:
logLt = µ logLt−1 + α0 logQt + α1 logQt−1 + β0 logwt + β1 logwt−1
[+γ0 log ct + γ1 log ct−1] + b+ ε , (1)
where L is the number of employees; Q is production; w is labour cost (wage + benefits
+ wage related taxes and contributions); and c is capital cost. ε ∼ i.i.d.N (0, σ). In the
standard model, it is assumed that γ0 = −β0 and γ1 = −β1.
This model can be derived from a standard theory of profit maximizing firm, fac-
ing constrained demand, under a budget constraint represented by a Cobb-Douglas
production function. See Nickell [1986] and Ma´tya´s and Sevestre [1996], Chapter 25 for
the derivation. The major assumptions of the theoretical model, used as the general
framework, are the following. The existence of a long-run equilibrium is assumed: the
production function is linearised in its neighbourhood. Adjustment costs (of labour and
capital) are assumed to be quadratic. Exogenous variables are assumed to follow AR(2)
processes.
2 Their results on Hungary are mostly negative which is probably due to their sample period
(1988-92). Their findings on the non-existence of the wage curve in Hungary is explained
and strongly qualified by Kertesi and Ko¨llo˝ [1997].
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However, a stable long-run equilibrium path is unlikely to have existed during
the transition period. I assume that as Hungary went through different phases of the
transition process during the sample period, with different labour market characteristics,
and these properties can be used for identifying different phases of the transition process.
Thus, labour demand models are estimated for each year separately. It is tested whether
downward and upward elasticities are equal, i.e., the validity of the assumption on the
adjustment costs.
There can also be characteristic differences among different groups of firms in the
behaviour of these firms on the labour market: Some firms could adjust to market con-
ditions relatively easily, for others transition was a much more painful process. Several
different groups of firms are identified, and the differences in their behaviour is ex-
plored. We look at the heterogeneity of labour demand over the sectors, over the type
ownership, and over the size of the firm.
The above base model is, however, only the point of departure in the exploratory
work. It is tested whether the function can be simplified either to a quasi differenced
form (differencing by (1− µL))3 or to a differenced form (1− L). As the measurement
of the cost of capital is very unreliable (c.f., Appendix B) it is also tested whether the
cost of capital can be omitted.4
Equation (1) was simplified to the following differenced equation:
D logLt = α0D logQt + β0D logwt + b+ e , (2)
where Dlog stands for the logarithmic differences. However, this function was augmented
in the next step by several factors: first, by a measure of the productive efficiency, second
by dummies describing the ownership and the size of the firm.
The variable describing productive efficiency is taken from a dynamic Cobb-Douglas
frontier production function:5
log Yt = c+ α logLt + β logKt + µ log Yt−1 + vt − ut , (3)
where Y stands for the value added, L for labour input, K for capital stock, v is the
usual disturbance term (assumed to be v ∼ i.i.d.N (0, σv)), while u is assumed to have
i.i.d. truncated normal distribution (for u > 0), representing firm specific inefficiencies,
compared to the ‘best-practice’ firm in the sample (c.f., Halpern and Ko˝ro¨si [2000],
[2001] for details.) The (−û) term represents productive efficiency, and is used in the
augmented labour demand equation. Thus the final form is:
D logLt = α0D logQt + β0D logwt + γ(−û) +
∑
δiDi + b+ e , (4)
3 For example, α1 = −µα0, etc.
4 Omitting the cost of capital may obviously bias the estimation of wage elasticities. However,
coefficient estimates usually changed very little with the inclusion/omission of the cost of
capital variable, but the standard errors were much larger with included cost of capital,
indicating large uncertainty in measurement.
5 The translog production function only fits very marginally better, and it is hampered by
strong multicollinearity, leading to many insignificant coefficients.
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where Di stands for the dummy variables. Output, cost of labour and efficiency are
treated as endogenous variables. (c.f., Appendix B)
4. Labour demand estimation results
Selected estimation results of the base model (excluding capital cost) are summarized
in Tables 5 to 7 in Appendix C.6 If one looks at the estimation results based on the
entire sample (Table 5), the first obvious observation is that the subsamples for ex-
panding and declining firms give completely different estimates; upwards output and
wage elasticities are much smaller (in absolute values) than downwards elasticities, in-
dicating a serious asymmetry in adjustment costs throughout the entire sample period.
Except for the initial years, labour demand is very inelastic at the firms which can
increase production, while it is much more elastic at downsizing firms, and that is even
more true for the years at the end of the decade than for the mid-1990’s. Simplifi-
cation hypotheses for differences were usually rejected, thus, the level form should be
maintained. The assumption that the coefficients for log(wt) and log(wt−1) are equal
to those of − log(ct) and − log(ct−1) was rejected in the majority of cases. Although
the capital cost was usually significant, its coefficients frequently had very strange esti-
mated values, and their omission had no noticeable influence on the other coefficients,
thus the cost of capital could be omitted from the specification without substantially
changing conclusions. However, the estimation results are ridden with serious specifi-
cation problems. The overidentification test indicates that information contents of the
instruments is seriously underutilized in the estimation, almost all structural break tests
are significant, indicating a substantial heterogeneity of the corporate labour demand.
Significant structural breaks with respect to firm size suggest non-linear relationship
(or, more precisely, different functional form for the underlying model).
A completely different picture emerges when we estimate the same demand equation
for various groups of firms. If we use relatively large groups, like manufacturing, there
still are many significant diagnostic tests. The structural break between firms with
increasing and decreasing output is frequently significant, but the earlier clear pattern
of strong asymmetry is no longer identifiable. The cost of capital variable looses its
significance, but the simplification assumptions are still frequently significantly rejected.
After a further disaggregation of the sample, however, specification tests become
insignificant.7 There still are significant structural breaks among consecutive years,
but there are no observable systematic discrepancies between expanding and downsiz-
ing firms. Ownership does not seem to differentiate the labour demand of the firms.
Restrictions leading to the differenced equations are usually insignificant.
Thus, the most striking conclusions, drawn from the demand equation estimated
for the entire sample, disappear, if we properly take into account the heterogeneity
6 Please find the legend to the tables on the first page of Appendix C.
7 Engineering is included as example. The sector was selected because of the large sample
size; the non-significance of diagnostic tests cannot be the consequence of low power due to
insufficient sample information.
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of the firms. Upwards and downwards elasticities are no longer significantly different,
specification tests usually are insignificant. Heterogeneity of labour demand seems to
be linked to sectoral, i.e., technological differences. Ownership does not seem to make
much difference in the labour market behaviour of the firms after taking into account
sectoral differences.8
One important common feature of all estimates of the base model is that while
the short-run elasticities are usually in the expected range, derived long-run elastici-
ties fluctuate apparently arbitrarily in an unacceptably wide range. Thus, the long-run
properties of the model seem to be uncertain, which indicates that the underlying as-
sumption of a long-run equilibrium seems to be invalid. It is not at all surprising for
the first half of the sample, which covers the consolidation period after the transitional
recession. However, this instability indicates that no stable corporate labour market
behaviour emerged by the late 1990’s; this still was a transitional period.
As the long-run characteristics of the labour demand equations seem to be uncer-
tain, and the restrictions leading to a differenced form are usually insignificant at the
disaggregate level, the analysis is continued with the augmented short run equations of
model (4). Estimation results are summarized in Tables 8-11.
The additional regressors of the augmented equation are efficiency, ownership dum-
mies, and size dummies. While ownership does not have a significant effect on the output
and wage elasticity of labour demand, a significant coefficient for the ownership dummy
indicates an ownership related shift in the labour demand function. Size dummies are
included for diagnostic purposes: a significant coefficient indicates incorrect functional
form.
Estimation results of the augmented short-run model also were very much influ-
enced by the heterogeneity of the firms for the entire sample. If we look at the sectoral
level, most diagnostic tests are insignificant, although the share of significant diagnostic
tests clearly exceeds the significance level.
The overall statistical properties of the estimated augmented short-run equations
are not substantially better than those of the ‘simple’ short-run equations. Although
most diagnostic tests are insignificant at the sectoral level (trade is the only sector with
significant overidentification test for all years), some important information is missing
from the specification. However, the additional variables of the augmented model are
insignificant in the majority of the cases at the sectoral level.
Productive efficiency, when significant, always had positive effect on labour demand.
It suggests that efficient firms are more likely to increase employment, all other factors
being equal. However, the evidence for this positive relationship is rather week. It
is interesting to note that the inclusion of efficiency frequently exerted a substantial
8 Ko˝ro¨si [2000] extensively analysed regional variations, and it was found that there were no
significant regional behavioural differences in labour demand, even though the government
experimented with various employment-related subsidy schemes in regions with high unem-
ployment, hoping to promote job creation in those regions. Substantial regional variations
in aggregate employment dynamics seem to be the consequence of regional differences in
the factor endowments of the firms.
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influence on the estimated values of the wage elasticity (usually driving it towards zero)
even when efficiency itself was insignificant. Its effect on the output elasticity was
smaller.9 Thus, productive efficiency may rather influence labour demand indirectly,
making efficient firms less sensitive to changes in the cost of labour. This suggests a
more complex relationship of productive efficiency and labour demand. The next section
will try to expand the production model along those lines.
Ownership dummies were rarely significant in the sectoral estimates, and their
signs are mixed, indicating no substantial ownership effect on labour demand. Size was
significant far too frequently, especially for small firms, indicating that Cobb-Douglas
production function is probably too simple. However, the overall influence on the output
and wage elasticities was negligible.
The labour demand equations fit surprisingly well in the first years of the sample,
i.e., in the consolidation period, when far the largest changes occurred. It indicates
that those large reductions of employment were indeed driven by the most important
economic factors. The fit deteriorated somewhat in the second half of the sample period,
but it is still acceptable, given the characteristics of the sample information. (A large
cross section of firms, and the dependent variable is the change in employment.)
Output elasticity had a slight decreasing tendency over time for most sectors. Its
value tended to be larger in the consolidation period, when its typical value was some-
where in the neighbourhood of 0.5, than in the expansionary period, when its value
usually was somewhere between 0.3–0.4. However, the 95% confidence intervals overlap
for most sectors, thus the coefficients are only statistically significantly different over
time in a minority of sectors. Wage elasticity fluctuated much more over time (and
their estimated standard errors tended to be larger, indicating that these estimates are
somewhat less reliable). During the consolidation period the wage elasticity rarely was
significantly different from −1, although the estimated coefficient usually was on the
inelastic side. Later the estimated value of the labour cost elasticity got much closer
to zero, and for some sectors it tended to be insignificant in the late 1990’s, except for
1999, when demand became somewhat more elastic in most manufacturing sectors.
The international evidence on labour demand is rather mixed. Different studies use
different assumptions and thus specifications, and the characteristics of the datasets vary
considerably. However, comparing the labour demand models estimated for Hungary to
the ones estimated either to developed market economies (for some recent studies c.f.,
Arellano and Bond [1991], Bresson, Kramarz and Sevestre [1992], Hamermesh [1992]
and for more comprehensive results Hamermesh [1993]), or other transition economies
(Basu et al. [1997], Estrin and Svejnar [1998],10 Grosfeld and Nivet [1997] or Singer
9 The inclusion of the dummies alone usually had very little effect on the estimated wage and
output elasticities.
10 The elasticities in the labour demand equations estimated for Hungary in both Basu et al.
[1997] and Estrin and Svejnar [1998] are also lower than my estimates here or in Ko˝ro¨si
[1997]. Those two studies basically use the same rather small sample, derived from survey
data, which may be less reliable than the official financial accounts of the firms.
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[1996]11) the Hungarian output and wage elasticities were relatively large in the con-
solidation period. Coefficient estimates for the post-1995 period are much more in line
with elasticities estimated for market economies.
5. Labour adjustment in production models
An alternative to the labour demand model, derived from the production function is
the modification of the production function to account for the possibility of labour
adjustment. This model explains the inefficiency of the frontier production model as
a function of the imperfect labour adjustment. The maintained hypothesis is that as
labour adjustment is costly, full adjustment is suboptimal.12 Thus companies will hoard
labour, and will pay somewhat higher wages than absolutely necessary to minimise
adjustment cost. Two alternative treatments were attempted.
5.1 Direct heterogeneity of labour
Here we also take into account the heterogeneity of labour. Two types of labour input are
distinguished: skilled and unskilled workers.13 The Cobb-Douglas production function
of equation (3) is modified: the inefficiency term u is replaced by variables describing
the labour market conditions of the firm.
log Yt = c+ α logLt + β logKt + µ log Yt−1 +Xβ + v ,
where X stands for the following additional variables:
Dlog(L): change of log employment;
log(Ls/Lu): log of the ratio of skilled/unskilled workers;
log(w∗s): the deviation from the outside option wage of skilled workers;
log(w∗u): the deviation from the outside option wage of unskilled workers;
and the ownership dummies previously used.
Wage for outside option is measured by a Mincerian wage equation: it is assumed
that other firms, lacking any other information, would pay according to standard ob-
servable human capital characteristics, while the current employer will have additional
information on the worker’s abilities. Table 12 summarizes the estimates for the under-
lying wage equations.
Unfortunately, we only have sufficient sample on the employees for a relatively
small number of firms. Thus, this model is only estimated for the largest firms in the
11 Singer uses monthly observations, thus the elasticities in that study correspond to a very
different time frame.
12 See Blanchard and Sevestre [1999] for details.
13 Kertesi and Ko¨llo˝ [2002] describe the dataset in detail.
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sample.14 Thus, this estimation is treated as a kind of experiment. Estimation results
are presented in Table 13.
The most important factor influencing productive efficiency is the skill distribution
of labour. High share of skilled labour has a strong positive effect on production. The
effect of all other variables seems to be unstable: while they are jointly significant in
all years, the individual coefficients fluctuate substantially. It is interesting to observe,
how little ownership effect remains after taking into account the labour adjustment and
the quality of labour. Nevertheless, the small sample size clearly invalidates inference,
thus the direct treatment of skill heterogeneity had to be abandoned.
5.2 Indirect heterogeneity of labour
Following the logic of Blanchard and Sevestre [1999] and Blanchard et al [2002], the
skill heterogeneity of labour is treated indirectly. Full adjustment of productive inputs
to changed market conditions may not be optimal for the firm, thus labour and capital
may be underutilised or productive capacity may be constrained by the actual input
level. This partial adjustment of input use obviously influences productive efficiency.
This problem is especially relevant in a transition economy like Hungary. Dynamic
firms could increase output by an average 30% annually between 1992 and 1999, while
production at downsizing firms also declined substantially.15 (C.f., Table 2 for details.)
Obviously, full adjustment of all inputs to such large shifts is difficult and it may be
very expensive. We assume that the adjustment can only be partial on the short run.
The production process cannot reach the efficiency frontier with suboptimal alloca-
tion of inputs. In the previous sections we just applied a measure of this inefficiency, but
the above argument also provides us with an explanation. We identify three possible
sources of inefficiencies: slack or insufficient use of labour, capital and skills.
Maintaining the Cobb-Douglas technology of equation (3), we augment it with a
variable St, representing the skill composition of labour, and put structure into the
inefficiency term u. Instead of using distributional assumptions for its measurement,
as in the previous section, we assume that inefficiency is the consequence of insufficient
adjustment to the optimal level of inputs:
ut = αs log(L∗t /Lt) + βs log(K
∗
t /Kt) + ωs log(S
∗
t /St) + t , (5)
where asterisk denotes the (unobservable) optimal level of input use. αs, βs and
ωs ‘slack’ elasticities measure the contribution of insufficient labour, capital and skill
adjustment to inefficiency.
As skill level is unobservable, we use the wage as a proxy, assuming that it is set
according to skills. As optimal use of factor inputs is also unobserved, partial adjustment
14 Due to the small number of observations reliable frontier estimation was not feasible. It is
assumed that inefficiency is fully accounted for by the above factors.
15 More than 10% of the firms in the sample at least doubled output (in real terms) every year
after 1995.
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is assumed. Straightforward derivation (c.f., Blanchard et al [2002] for details) leads to
the following extended dynamic production function:
log Yt = c+ µ log Yt−1 + α logLt − αµ logLt−1 + β logKt − βµ logKt−1
+ ω logwt − ωµ logwt−1 − ut + µut−1 + vt . (6a)
After substituting formula (5) we get:
log Yt = c+ µ log Yt−1 + (α+ αs) logLt − (αµ+ αs) logLt−1 + (β + βs) logKt
− (βµ+ βs) logKt−1 + (ω + ωs) logwt − (ωµ+ ωs) logwt−1 + vt . (6b)
Table 14 presents the estimation results annually for the entire sample, while Tables
15 and 16 summarizes comparable results for manufacturing and engineering. Labour
and capital elasticities are largely in line with expectations, especially if estimates for
the entire sample are considered. However, capital elasticity is surprisingly high in
manufacturing sectors. Skill elasticity is also very high, especially in the early transition
period, but also towards the end of the sample, in the fast recovery period.
The driving force behind inefficiencies mostly seems to be the inadequate capital
adjustment. Labour adjustment problems seem to hamper the manufacturing sector
most, but that may just be the consequence of structural breaks in the parameters (re-
flecting technological heterogeneity of sectors), as a more detailed analysis of individual
manufacturing sectors do not usually suggest such a relationship. The adjustment in the
skill composition of labour seems to be slightly more problematic than adjustment of the
level of employment, especially when insufficient capital adjustment causes inefficiencies.
6. Conclusions
The behaviour of the firms in a transforming economy can be reasonably described by
a standard dynamic labour demand model. However, if the heterogeneity of corporate
behaviour is ignored, empirical results may offer a very tempting, but also very mis-
leading interpretation. Probably the most important conclusion of the present exercise
is that disregarding sectoral differences may lead to invalid conclusions.16
Although most labour demand functions, estimated for Hungary for the years 1992-
9, are rather similar to empirical labour demand models of mature market economies,
corporate behaviour is unstable both over time and over sectors. Even after a decade
of transition to market economy no stable long-run corporate labour market behaviour
emerged, which indicates a continuing substantial uncertainty of the corporate sector.17
16 Konings [2001] also emphasizes the importance of sectoral differences in the analysis of
transitional labour markets.
17 Grosfeld and Nivet [1997] suggested that the bulk of the adjustment occurred in one single
transition year (1991) in Poland. The sample period ends too early in both Basu et al.
[1997] and Estrin and Svejnar [1998], but their results for the Czech Republic may also
indicate a kind of normalization for 1993.
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These estimates for Hungary clearly reject the suggestion that transition was completed
in 1992 on the labour market.18 This also suggests that labour market policy should be
cautious with sudden large changes as consequences may be less predictable in Hungary
than in a mature market economy. The estimated wage and output elasticities char-
acterise the Hungarian labour market as a rather inflexible one towards the end of the
1990’s, which may explain the relatively low overall job-creation in the period of rapid
growth with moderate increases in the cost of labour.
An important negative result of this study is that ownership had no discernible
effect on the Hungarian corporate labour market behaviour after 1992.19 This is a
somewhat surprising finding, as it contradicts to the conclusions of most studies on
transition economies.20
On the other hand, the overwhelming presence of foreign firms does seem to have
a strong dynamic effect on the corporate labour market behaviour. Labour demand
was much more elastic both with respect to output and wages in Hungary in the initial
years of transition than in most Western European economies. By the end of the sample
period, labour demand in Hungary had very similar characteristics than in a typical
European market economy, indicating that ‘Western’ behavioural rules were gradually
imposed on the Hungarian firms, even if they are domestically owned. This indicates
that the Hungarian labour market can be swiftly integrated into the labour market
of the European Union at accession, as the basic behavioural patterns are practically
identical. However, this labour market conformity will make it more difficult to achieve
the ambitious Lisbon employment targets.
Skill composition seems to be an important ingredient in labour adjustment. Ap-
parently, inproper adjustment to skill requirement was an important factor of productive
inefficiencies at the early phase of transition. The high elasticity of skilled labour indi-
cates that it is essential for firms, and there seem to be some adjustment problems at the
end of the sample period. This is analagous to the findings in Kertesi and Ko¨llo˝ [2001b]
(or [2001a]): economic recovery created jobs almost exclusively for skilled workers, and
apparently firms cannot find enough skilled workers on the (local) labour market.
Finally, productive efficiency seems to have little direct influence on labour demand.
If efficiency is significant, it has a positive effect, thus more efficient production ceteris
paribus increases employment. This effect, however, is small. The changes in estimated
wage elasticities from the standard to the augmented short-run labour demand model
point to a more substantial indirect efficiency effect. While labour hoarding does not
seem to cause substantial loss in productive efficiency, capital adjustment seems to be a
more serious problem, probably due to liquidity constraints emerging from the financial
sector.
18 This is very much in line with results on other aspects of corporate behaviour analysed in
Halpern and Ko˝ro¨si [1998a], [1998b] and [2001].
19 Ko˝ro¨si [1997] found that the labour market behaviour of foreign-owned firms was more
stable than that of other firms in the early years of transition.
20 Halpern and Ko˝ro¨si [2001] found significant ownership effect in other aspects of the be-
haviour of practically the same firms. Kertesi and Ko¨llo˝ [1999] and [2001a] found a fast
decreasing, but persistent wage premium at foreign-owned firms.
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Appendix A: Definitions
All variables (except employment) were deflated, usually with four digit sectoral pro-
ducer price indices. There were some—usually small—sectors, where the price index
was only available at a higher level of aggregation (2 or 3 digit sectors). Variables are
measured in million Forints at 1991 prices. The variables are:
Labour (L): Annual average full-time employment at the firm.
Labour cost (w): The average annual wage and payroll tax (social security contribu-
tion) of an employee.
Output (Q): Sales total, net of revenue from asset sales and other extraordinary
sources.
Capital (K): Fixed assets. See data section for qualifications.
Capital cost (c): Depreciation over fixed assets. See data section for qualifications.
Valued added (Y): Sales total (Q) less broadly defined material costs.
Efficiency: The error term (−û) of the frontier production function of equation (3).
Profit margin: Pre-tax profits relative to sales.
Large firm: A firm where the number of employees is greater than 500, or the value of
fixed assets is greater than 1bn. 1991 forints or sales volume is greater than 1.5bn.
1991 forints.
Small firm: A firm where the number of employees is less than 50, or the value of fixed
assets is less than 20m. 1991 forints or sales volume is less than 25m. 1991 forints.
(Domestic) private firm: A firm where named persons (investors, employees and
managers) owned more than 50% of the equity capital. Firms owned indirectly (by
domestic firms) are excluded, as the parent company can be a SOE.
State owned firm: A firm where the central and local governments together owned
more than 50% of the equity capital.
Foreign owned firm: Foreign investors owned more than 50% of the equity capital.
Important foreign minority ownership: Foreign investors owned 25-50% of the eq-
uity capital. This category may include firms, which are present at other ownership
categories.
‘Other’ ownership: No clear majority owner by type, or more than 50% of the equity
capital is indirectly owned (i.e., by another corporation). (Indirect ownership fre-
quently meant state ownership in the early 1990’s; it was usually domestic private
ownership by the end of the decade.)
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Appendix B: Data issues21
The dataset consists of variables obtained from the financial accounts of Hungarian firms
between 1990 and 1999.22 The sample is based on the wage survey, described in Ko¨llo˝
[2001]. The wage survey covers firms employing more than 20 (until 1995) or 10 (later
years) people; however, it does not include all such firms. Sampling is heavily biased
towards large firms; almost all firms employing more than 500 people are included.
A large number of new firms were established during this period, while many old
firms disappeared, either because they went bankrupt, or were broken up during the
reorganization process. Some new firms were de novo enterprises founded by domestic or
foreign investors, but many were created from the assets of existing SOEs. In our dataset
firms are identified by their tax file number. However, whenever a firm is reorganized,
e.g., corporatized, it receives a new tax file number, even if there was no real change
in assets or activities. A major task when compiling the dataset was to identify firms
in case of which commercialisation only meant the change of the name. In other cases
they were treated as totally new entities following the natural way of entry and exit.
Unfortunately, a crucial sector of the labour market is largely omitted due to the lack
of sample information: the emerging small enterprises. Table 1 summarizes coverage.
Manufacturing is obviously overrepresented, but the sample covers more than 60% of
employment even in other sectors.
Many observations, however, had to be excluded due to data problems, e.g., missing
observations, so the actual sample size of the estimations is smaller, but the coverage,
measured by employment or sales, is still high in all years.
Employment is measured in annual average number of full-time employees. It is
not possible to correct for part-time employment, however, that is usually negligible.
Employment figures also include an unknown number of people on long-term unpaid
leave (child care and military service). These uncertainties may also have an effect on
the labour cost. All other variables are measured in million Forints at 1991 producer
prices.
Capital stock of firms was not measured reliably in the sample period. The capital
stock of a firm could have been revalued several times after 1990: once when the firm
was corporatized, at least once, but in case of larger firms frequently 3–4 times before
privatisation and usually after privatisation as well. These revaluations in some cases
repeatedly substantially changed the size of the capital stock without incurring any
new (dis)investment. As timing and magnitude of these revaluations are unknown, no
adjustment is feasible.
21 I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. Jo´zsef Becsei (CSO) and his collaborators for
their assistance in compiling the database. I maintain and use the database together with
La´szlo´ Halpern. This research would not have been possible without his cooperation.
22 The analysis starts with 1992, observations from the first two years are only used for lagged
(perhaps also differenced) variables.
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Table 1: Summary statistics on the representativeness of the sample
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Manufacturing
Total number of firms 11146 13234 13953 15089 16936 18927 20153 20830
Firms in sample 3315 3870 4003 4090 4551 5068 4387 4182
Share (%) 29.7 29.2 28.7 27.1 26.9 26.8 21.8 20.1
Employment, % share 87.1 88.3 88.3 88.2 89.4 88.9 85.9 82.3
Sales total, % share 86.3 87.9 88.8 88.8 92.8 92.7 91.2 89.8
Value added, % share 90.7 90.8 91.9 92.2 96.2 94.5 93.1 91.3
Exports, % share 92.1 92.3 92.0 92.8 99.4 98.0 98.0 96.9
Other sectors
Total number of firms 45581 58266 65839 75134 88707 101496 110682 117488
Firms in sample 6958 8587 8540 8663 9751 11496 8569 8108
Share (%) 15.3 14.7 13.0 11.5 11.0 11.3 7.7 6.9
Employment, % share 83.8 80.9 82.8 80.5 77.4 75.5 68.7 63.2
Sales total, % share 70.8 70.5 65.9 64.8 68.0 69.1 64.4 60.7
Value added, % share 78.9 84.1 80.7 84.7 85.5 85.8 80.5 76.5
Exports, % share 66.0 61.0 56.3 52.8 67.8 75.8 78.4 68.6
All firms
Total number of firms 56727 71500 79792 90223 105643 120423 130835 138318
Firms in sample 10273 12457 12543 12773 14302 16564 12956 12290
Share (%) 18.1 17.4 15.7 14.2 13.5 13.8 9.9 8.9
Employment, % share 85.0 83.5 84.8 83.3 81.8 80.6 75.2 70.3
Sales total, % share 75.6 75.9 73.0 72.8 76.2 77.4 73.7 70.8
Value added, % share 83.4 86.7 85.1 87.8 90.0 89.6 85.8 82.6
Exports, % share 80.6 79.0 78.6 79.0 90.2 92.4 93.3 90.6
The cost of capital was measured as the effective average rate of depreciation which
may be influenced by these revaluations. However, that probably is the minor source
of measurement error in the cost of capital. There are many firms with clearly invalid
reported depreciation: For more than 10% of the sample depreciation is either greater
than half the net value of fixed assets, or less than 1% of the value of fixed assets, both
of which is impossible. Apparently some firms use depreciation as a balancing item in
their books: this is the only relatively large expenditure item which does not have to
be substantiated by bills. Approximately 25% of the firms reported 0 profits with the
precision of our observations (one million forints); for more than half of these firms the
rounding error was less than 0.5% of the sales total. We suspect that many such firms
applied creative accounting practices to avoid the necessity of reporting either losses or
profits.
Table 2 presents the means of some important variables in all years for the entire
sample and for some relevant subsamples, while Table 3 gives similar descriptive statis-
tics on manufacturing firms.23 Many firms could increase their output considerably,
23 The sample changes from year to year partly because some firms disappear from the sample,
others enter, and also because firms may move from one subset to another in consecutive
years. Percentage changes were computed to facilitate a better temporal comparison: It
is the weighted average change of the variable from the previous year for the firms in the
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Table 2: Sample means of all firms, subsamples by output
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Entire sample
Number of observations 4287 6992 8507 9254 9858 11448 11485 11207
Employment 290 174 165 152 138 124 126 123
Employment (% change) -16.8 -12.7 -4.0 -8.6 -3.5 -1.3 0.7 -3.0
Labour cost (’000 Ft./cap) 380.4 461.5 463.8 417.1 395.2 396.6 417.2 444.8
Labour cost (% change) 7.2 6.4 2.9 -9.5 -4.5 -0.1 1.9 6.4
Output (m Ft.) 542.1 443.5 453.8 430.7 428.8 435.5 498.7 562.4
Output (% change) -16.0 0.0 8.0 0.2 3.7 9.8 13.5 11.9
Profit margin (%) -36.2 -42.7 -31.5 -3.2 -13.1 1.1 -22.7 -10.1
Change of output > 0
Number of observations 917 3125 4463 3873 4269 5473 6713 5633
Employment 331 179 166 167 144 130 136 150
Employment (% change) 1.7 -1.5 6.4 3.4 4.3 6.8 7.0 3.9
Labour cost (’000 Ft./cap) 471.7 513.4 495.7 447.5 426.6 425.3 443.0 464.8
Labour cost (% change) 8.7 8.7 4.2 -5.9 -0.7 3.8 1.1 7.5
Output (m Ft.) 966.8 545.8 578.6 581.7 560.3 602.5 614.5 776.9
Output (% change) 69.4 36.0 27.8 25.3 28.2 32.9 31.3 30.5
Profit margin (%) -4.4 -21.4 -7.0 14.3 -4.5 1.9 4.6 -5.8
Change of output ≤ 0
Number of observations 3370 3867 4044 5381 5589 5975 4772 5574
Employment 278 171 163 141 134 119 113 96
Employment (% change) -21.4 -20.4 -13.5 -16.9 -9.1 -8.2 -8.3 -12.4
Labour cost (’000 Ft./cap) 355.5 419.5 428.6 395.2 371.2 370.4 380.9 424.6
Labour cost (% change) 6.7 4.3 1.3 -12.3 -7.7 -3.8 3.3 5.2
Output (m Ft.) 426.5 360.8 316.1 322.0 328.4 282.5 335.8 345.7
Output (% change) -35.9 -24.5 -17.8 -20.6 -16.9 -18.0 -15.9 -15.5
Profit margin (%) -44.9 -59.9 -58.5 -15.8 -19.7 0.4 -61.0 -14.5
No foreign owner
Number of observations 3588 5422 6656 7254 7739 8894 8954 8739
Employment 299 166 151 134 116 102 102 97
Employment (% change) -17.7 -13.0 -7.3 -10.4 -4.8 -3.1 -1.2 -4.6
Labour cost (’000 Ft./cap) 347.3 408.9 413.0 370.8 343.8 331.2 348.8 369.8
Labour cost (% change) 7.9 7.3 1.6 -10.0 -6.1 -1.5 0.2 5.8
Output (m Ft.) 499.5 362.3 323.1 268.3 242.4 220.2 239.3 241.5
Output (% change) -18.0 -6.0 1.1 -5.4 -2.1 -0.4 6.6 2.0
Profit margin (%) -39.3 -46.1 -36.2 -8.6 -12.1 -4.7 -29.7 -7.8
Important foreign owner
Number of observations 212 395 431 411 393 458 408 373
Employment 222 215 276 269 260 247 192 164
Employment (% change) -11.3 -7.9 18.9 -18.3 -3.6 -2.7 -1.4 -11.7
Labour cost (’000 Ft./cap) 527.4 579.1 584.7 490.7 471.4 522.8 527.8 561.7
Labour cost (% change) 2.8 8.6 3.1 -12.5 -6.0 2.5 2.8 7.0
Output (m Ft.) 568.5 689.9 785.0 1641.3 1741.5 1638.0 924.0 887.3
Output (% change) -16.8 12.9 11.5 4.9 2.9 5.6 2.0 -2.9
Profit margin (%) -13.8 -8.7 -14.6 -8.8 -3.0 -3.0 -0.3 -78.4
Majority foreign owner
Number of observations 348 964 1193 1367 1500 1887 1935 1919
Employment 233 194 182 203 209 194 221 227
Employment (% change) -7.9 -3.1 3.4 2.3 0.9 4.1 6.2 2.3
Labour cost (’000 Ft./cap) 588.0 681.5 683.6 629.1 634.2 666.5 701.5 752.0
Labour cost (% change) 5.7 4.2 6.6 -7.3 -0.1 3.0 5.9 7.5
Output (m Ft.) 807.9 771.2 856.0 934.3 1052.1 1155.1 1606.5 1950.4
Output (% change) 11.0 18.6 27.2 8.4 12.9 23.8 21.0 20.8
Profit margin (%) -9.6 -19.1 -16.0 29.6 -21.1 31.6 5.2 -7.9
(sub)sample in the current year.
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Table 3: Sample means, manufacturing, subsamples by output
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Entire sample
Number of observations 1458 2215 2811 3066 3251 3793 3914 3844
Employment 314 215 191 178 170 155 159 158
Employment (% change) -15.8 -13.6 -5.6 -1.9 -1.6 2.0 2.9 -2.0
Labour cost (’000 Ft./cap) 367.4 425.8 438.8 411.1 392.8 392.8 402.7 425.6
Labour cost (% change) 9.0 12.6 3.0 -5.6 -3.1 1.1 6.4 7.8
Output (m Ft.) 688.7 530.5 544.3 557.4 564.8 593.6 677.0 810.3
Output (% change) 0.4 5.6 10.2 10.2 7.3 19.1 16.7 18.6
Profit margin (%) -40.3 -17.0 -19.7 -9.5 -4.6 15.3 0.4 -1.4
Change of output > 0
Number of observations 424 1209 1665 1594 1536 1970 2315 1901
Employment 327 218 197 192 174 181 154 167
Employment (% change) -1.9 -8.7 1.0 5.5 7.7 8.7 11.2 7.5
Labour cost (’000 Ft./cap) 417.3 445.5 465.2 439.8 422.7 409.9 423.2 454.2
Labour cost (% change) 12.7 17.0 3.1 -0.1 2.9 5.6 9.1 10.0
Output (m Ft.) 1250.8 643.0 708.0 756.9 609.5 891.8 760.3 1075.4
Output (% change) 87.2 28.7 24.2 25.1 35.9 38.1 41.6 43.7
Profit margin (%) -4.7 -4.0 -1.7 -0.9 2.7 3.0 3.9 3.3
Change of output ≤ 0
Number of observations 1034 1006 1146 1472 1715 1823 1599 1943
Employment 309 210 182 163 166 127 167 148
Employment (% change) -20.7 -19.1 -14.5 -10.0 -9.1 -6.9 -6.4 -10.7
Labour cost (’000 Ft./cap) 346.9 402.2 400.4 380.1 366.0 374.3 372.9 397.6
Labour cost (% change) 7.3 7.3 2.7 -11.8 -8.7 -3.9 2.2 5.6
Output (m Ft.) 458.2 395.2 306.6 341.3 524.8 271.4 556.5 551.0
Output (% change) -33.9 -21.9 -20.2 -14.4 -12.0 -20.0 -13.4 -11.0
Profit margin (%) -54.8 -32.6 -45.7 -18.8 -11.2 28.6 -4.7 -6.1
No foreign owner
Number of observations 1063 1457 1873 2033 2176 2528 2598 2559
Employment 324 199 164 149 134 113 112 106
Employment (% change) -17.5 -11.3 -8.7 -4.0 -3.4 -0.8 0.6 -5.1
Labour cost (’000 Ft./cap) 326.6 371.2 382.2 355.6 334.7 327.5 337.5 358.9
Labour cost (% change) 10.0 14.1 -0.5 -9.0 -5.5 -1.8 6.7 8.5
Output (m Ft.) 704.9 460.4 306.1 294.6 249.0 226.3 222.7 222.1
Output (% change) 2.0 -1.1 1.2 4.2 -3.1 3.3 5.0 2.1
Profit margin (%) -50.6 -20.6 -17.1 -10.7 -5.5 -1.6 -0.2 -2.0
Important foreign owner
Number of observations 131 197 222 212 199 221 212 190
Employment 284 245 251 300 290 289 230 189
Employment (% change) -12.2 -9.7 -5.3 -3.4 -4.1 -0.1 -0.3 -9.1
Labour cost (’000 Ft./cap) 454.1 509.2 522.7 446.9 423.2 431.2 439.6 464.3
Labour cost (% change) 4.6 13.2 8.6 -6.3 -3.3 3.0 4.3 7.1
Output (m Ft.) 638.5 661.6 739.0 1896.4 1968.9 1981.7 817.7 629.0
Output (% change) -9.9 7.9 9.1 6.2 0.3 7.1 -2.5 -5.5
Profit margin (%) -9.3 -8.4 -21.8 -3.0 -3.4 0.8 -1.8 -1.1
Majority foreign owner
Number of observations 216 504 647 755 811 982 1036 1029
Employment 251 234 218 223 234 225 257 272
Employment (% change) -7.5 -5.2 2.1 2.5 2.7 6.1 7.2 3.4
Labour cost (’000 Ft./cap) 518.8 553.4 572.5 547.0 537.1 551.7 556.8 582.5
Labour cost (% change) 9.8 9.9 7.6 0.0 0.4 5.8 6.3 7.2
Output (m Ft.) 640.9 682.5 813.2 914.4 1085.4 1238.8 1804.0 2322.6
Output (% change) 12.1 21.7 27.2 19.0 19.3 34.2 23.4 25.7
Profit margin (%) -7.8 -9.9 -26.3 -8.7 -2.5 62.9 2.4 0.4
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and some firms could expand at a phenomenal rate during transition. However, it is
obvious that most of the expansion came from increased labour productivity.
Real labour cost increased steadily until the 1995 stabilization package. In the
early 1990’s a part of the labour cost increase was due to the approximately 10 percent-
age point annual wedge between consumer and producer prices:24 Employees (and trade
unions) strongly resisted cuts in real wages (i.e., their purchasing power), although they
could not always avoid it. However, as producer price inflation was substantially below
consumer price inflation, steady real wages for the employees meant quickly increasing
labour costs for the employers. Another important factor of the apparently fast increas-
ing labour cost was pure composition effect, especially in the early 1990’s: Low skilled,
and thus low paid workers were much more likely to be fired and much less likely to be
hired.
Initially, in 1990, practically all firms in the sample were owned by the state. This is
the period of rapid privatisation of the firms. Many firms were sold to foreign investors,
frequently to multinational companies. This privatisation process was largely completed
by 1997. frequently meant their sale to foreign investors. Widespread foreign ownership
became an important feature of the Hungarian economy, especially in manufacturing.
The panel dataset is used as a repeated cross section sample as substantial struc-
tural breaks are assumed among the turbulent years of the transition process. Even
though the sample is used as a series of cross sections, the basic heterogeneity of a panel
model has to be assumed here as well. In case of a dynamic model panel characteristics
of the data will not only lead to heteroscedastic errors, but the use of lagged dependent
explanatory variable may yield inconsistent OLS estimates, as there may be firm specific
effects in corporate labour demand, in which case the lagged dependent variable is not
independent of the individual effects incorporated in the error term.
Other explanatory variables may not be independent of the error term either.
Wages may not be exogenously set. The possible large measurement error in capital cost
may be related to firm specific components. Demand may not always be constrained for
all firms, in which case the production function will establish a link between production
and the stochastic component of labour. All variables in the model, but the dummies,
were treated endogenously to avoid inconsistencies stemming from these possible rela-
tionships. As level variables may be related to the firm specific component, and thus
to the disturbance term, instrumental variables of the base model are either lagged dif-
ferences or ratios. Instrumental variables of the differenced model, on the other hand,
are lagged levels of variables. Beside these lagged model variables (employment, pro-
duction and labour cost), sector dummies, properly transformed variables taken from
the financial accounts of the firms (e.g., bank cost, payables and receivables, etc.) and
relative variables (e.g., export share and share of different types of ownership) were used
as instruments.
24 Consumer prices increased by an annual 23% in 1992, 22.5% in 1993 and 18.8% in 1994,
while the producer price inflation was 12.3%, 10.8% and 11.3% in the same years. (Source:
CSO Statistical Yearbooks.)
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Appendix C: Estimation results
Table 4: Frontier production functions
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
All firms
Constant 0.64 ∗∗ 0.74 ∗∗ 0.48 ∗∗ 0.23 ∗∗ 0.23 ∗∗ 0.29 ∗∗ 0.35 ∗∗ 0.28 ∗∗
Yt−1 0.26 ∗∗ 0.53 ∗∗ 0.56 ∗∗ 0.66 ∗∗ 0.70 ∗∗ 0.67 ∗∗ 0.75 ∗∗ 0.78 ∗∗
log(L) 0.47 ∗∗ 0.26 ∗∗ 0.29 ∗∗ 0.23 ∗∗ 0.22 ∗∗ 0.21 ∗∗ 0.16 ∗∗ 0.15 ∗∗
log(K) 0.14 ∗∗ 0.11 ∗∗ 0.11 ∗∗ 0.11 ∗∗ 0.09 ∗∗ 0.12 ∗∗ 0.09 ∗∗ 0.09 ∗∗
σ 0.94 ∗∗ 0.89 ∗∗ 0.78 ∗∗ 0.72 ∗∗ 0.74 ∗∗ 0.71 ∗∗ 0.70 ∗∗ 0.69 ∗∗
σu/σv 1.23 ∗∗ 1.26 ∗∗ 1.25 ∗∗ 1.02 ∗∗ 1.31 ∗∗ 1.04 ∗∗ 1.21 ∗∗ 1.43 ∗∗
ret. to scale 0.82 ∗∗ 0.79 ∗∗ 0.91 ∗∗ 0.99 1.03 ∗ 1.00 0.99 1.08 ∗∗
Nob 5941 9343 10307 10749 11050 12774 11840 11288
Mean of dep.var 3.19 3.07 3.17 3.06 2.96 2.84 3.03 3.04
S.dev of dep.var 1.33 1.40 1.42 1.50 1.55 1.58 1.52 1.57
R2 0.69 0.75 0.81 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.89
Mean ineff. (%) -18.08 -17.85 -15.11 -13.36 -15.55 -14.28 -13.94 -14.52
Manufacturing
Constant 0.61 ∗∗ 0.75 ∗∗ 0.50 ∗∗ 0.22 ∗∗ 0.18 ∗∗ 0.31 ∗∗ 0.33 ∗∗ 0.20 ∗∗
Yt−1 0.29 ∗∗ 0.50 ∗∗ 0.49 ∗∗ 0.60 ∗∗ 0.68 ∗∗ 0.63 ∗∗ 0.67 ∗∗ 0.74 ∗∗
log(L) 0.46 ∗∗ 0.25 ∗∗ 0.30 ∗∗ 0.25 ∗∗ 0.22 ∗∗ 0.24 ∗∗ 0.19 ∗∗ 0.18 ∗∗
log(K) 0.16 ∗∗ 0.17 ∗∗ 0.17 ∗∗ 0.16 ∗∗ 0.12 ∗∗ 0.15 ∗∗ 0.15 ∗∗ 0.11 ∗∗
σ 0.92 ∗∗ 0.86 ∗∗ 0.77 ∗∗ 0.67 ∗∗ 0.66 ∗∗ 0.70 ∗∗ 0.63 ∗∗ 0.66 ∗∗
σu/σv 1.48 ∗∗ 1.63 ∗∗ 1.39 ∗∗ 0.90 ∗∗ 1.16 ∗∗ 1.27 ∗∗ 1.21 ∗∗ 1.54 ∗∗
ret. to scale 0.89 ∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗ 0.93 ∗∗ 1.01 1.07 ∗∗ 1.03 ∗ 1.02 1.12 ∗∗
Nob 1947 3007 3448 3646 3742 4297 4158 3974
Mean of dep.var 3.23 3.23 3.35 3.31 3.26 3.16 3.34 3.36
S.dev of dep.var 1.36 1.45 1.48 1.56 1.60 1.63 1.57 1.62
R2 0.74 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.90
Mean ineff. (%) -18.60 -17.78 -14.60 -10.66 -12.14 -13.73 -11.48 -12.80
Legend: Production functions were estimated by maximum likelihood. Asterisks after the
coefficients indicate that the t-test is significant at 0.05 level (∗) or at 0.01 level (∗∗). The
null for returns to scale (ν) is that ν = 1. σ denotes the standard error of the compound
disturbance term (σ2 = σ2u + σ
2
v), while σu/σv stands for the ratio of the two standard errors
(often denoted by λ). Mean inefficiency is normalized by the mean of the dependent variable.
Nob: number of observations.
Legend to the labour demand tables: All equations were estimated by instrumental
variables method with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. One asterisk (*) indicates
significance at 5% level, while two asterisks (**) indicate it at 1%. Wald tests are χ2 tests
for the joint significance of the nulls. In the case of sectors, sectoral dummies are tested as
additional regressors. Wald test for capital cost means the joint significance of γ0 = 0 and
γ1 = 0 in eq. (1). Wald test for labour = capital cost: the null hypothesis is: β0 = −γ0 and
β1 = −γ1 in eq. (1). Wald test for differenced form: the null hypothesis is: µ = 1, α0 = −α1 and
β0 = −β1 in eq. (1). Wald test for quasy differencing: the null hypothesis is: α0 = −µα1 and
β0 = −µβ1 in eq. (1). Possible structural breaks were tested by adding dummy premultiplied
non-dummy explanatory variables, and testing their joint significance (Wald test), analogously
to the Chow-test in OLS. Nob: number of observations. SEE: Standard error of estimation.
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Table 5: Labour demand equations: base model, all firms
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
log employment, lagged 0.81 ∗∗ 0.89 ∗∗ 0.94 ∗∗ 0.93 ∗∗ 0.92 ∗∗ 0.92 ∗∗ 0.95 ∗∗ 0.90 ∗∗
log production 0.77 ∗∗ 0.69 ∗∗ 0.63 ∗∗ 0.75 ∗∗ 0.87 ∗∗ 0.57 ∗∗ 0.60 ∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗
log production, lagged -0.62 ∗∗ -0.59 ∗∗ -0.54 ∗∗ -0.67 ∗∗ -0.75 ∗∗ -0.45 ∗∗ -0.51 ∗∗ -0.72 ∗∗
log labour cost -0.85 ∗∗ -0.62 ∗∗ -0.53 ∗∗ -0.74 ∗∗ -0.62 ∗∗ -0.78 ∗∗ -0.52 ∗∗ -0.94 ∗∗
log labour cost, lagged 0.67 ∗∗ 0.54 ∗∗ 0.47 ∗∗ 0.72 ∗∗ 0.57 ∗∗ 0.64 ∗∗ 0.46 ∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗
constant 0.12 -0.10 -0.25 ∗∗ -0.16 ∗∗ -0.30 ∗∗ -0.43 ∗∗ -0.27 ∗∗ -0.27 ∗∗
long-run prod. elasticity 0.75 ∗∗ 0.93 ∗∗ 1.41 ∗∗ 1.09 ∗∗ 1.44 ∗∗ 1.57 ∗∗ 1.66 ∗∗ 1.26 ∗∗
long-run wage elasticity -0.94 ∗∗ -0.68 -0.91 -0.26 -0.65 ∗ -1.88 ∗∗ -1.14 ∗ -1.05 ∗∗
Nob 3590 4326 6642 7889 8736 10045 10566 10767
Mean of dep. variable 4.91 4.45 4.21 4.10 3.98 3.86 3.89 3.83
S.dev of dep. variable 1.15 1.20 1.19 1.21 1.23 1.24 1.20 1.21
R2 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.93
SEE 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.32
Overidentification test 4.87 ∗∗ 7.21 ∗∗ 3.66 ∗∗ 3.70 ∗∗ 5.60 ∗∗ 14.90 ∗∗ 14.01 ∗∗ 13.54 ∗∗
Wald test for capital cost 11.98 ∗∗ 3.24 14.12 ∗∗ 10.04 ∗∗ 1.44 7.99 ∗ 10.47 ∗∗ 12.93 ∗∗
Wald test for lab=cap cost 105.89 ∗∗ 24.66 ∗∗ 16.67 ∗∗ 63.54 ∗∗ 33.57 ∗∗ 0.48 8.54 ∗ 12.93 ∗∗
Wald test for sectors 22.33 ∗∗ 37.19 ∗∗ 49.16 ∗∗ 27.25 ∗∗ 46.13 ∗∗ 96.67 ∗∗ 50.63 ∗∗ 58.32 ∗∗
Wald test for diff’ed form 53.95 ∗∗ 60.01 ∗∗ 40.96 ∗∗ 51.02 ∗∗ 63.72 ∗∗ 78.33 ∗∗ 68.06 ∗∗ 73.60 ∗∗
Wald test for quasy diff. 0.23 5.06 15.77 ∗∗ 15.07 ∗∗ 23.65 ∗∗ 53.53 ∗∗ 38.89 ∗∗ 11.28 ∗∗
Break at qt > qt−1 16.24 ∗∗ 28.09 ∗∗ 25.73 ∗∗ 36.17 ∗∗ 26.39 ∗∗ 33.62 ∗∗ 54.33 ∗∗ 49.28 ∗∗
Break at foreign ownership 14.76 ∗ 22.16 ∗∗ 7.26 20.47 ∗∗ 19.49 ∗∗ 19.31 ∗∗ 8.24 21.32 ∗∗
Break at majority for. own. 7.48 17.10 ∗∗ 10.85 10.37 19.14 ∗∗ 25.82 ∗∗ 5.58 27.95 ∗∗
Break at private own. 0.76 1.62 6.46 5.91 8.88 28.33 ∗∗ 11.50 ∗ 12.53 ∗
Break at ‘other’ own. 22.17 ∗∗ 19.77 ∗∗ 18.59 ∗∗ 21.27 ∗∗ 17.06 ∗∗ 7.54 10.38 19.34 ∗∗
Break at state own. 23.31 ∗∗ 8.24 3.23 3.71 14.68 ∗ 12.60 ∗ 9.56 14.83 ∗
Break at small firms 17.00 ∗∗ 12.49 ∗ 29.91 ∗∗ 15.12 ∗ 3.79 15.41 ∗∗ 12.57 ∗ 26.81 ∗∗
Break at med-sized firms 12.89 ∗ 14.08 ∗ 13.72 ∗ 9.02 24.71 ∗∗ 20.71 ∗∗ 13.81 ∗ 44.50 ∗∗
Break at large firms 20.75 ∗∗ 12.15 ∗ 4.96 19.42 ∗∗ 21.66 ∗∗ 21.02 ∗∗ 22.35 ∗∗ 45.57 ∗∗
Change of production > 0
log employment, lagged 0.71 ∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗ 0.95 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗ 0.97 ∗∗ 0.92 ∗∗ 0.96 ∗∗ 0.96 ∗∗
log production 0.97 ∗∗ 0.66 ∗∗ 0.19 0.28 0.00 0.34 ∗∗ 0.27 ∗ 0.03
log production, lagged -0.65 ∗∗ -0.49 ∗∗ -0.18 ∗ -0.27 0.03 -0.26 ∗ -0.23 0.04
log labour cost -1.27 ∗∗ -0.73 ∗∗ -0.03 -0.13 0.17 -0.47 ∗∗ -0.15 -0.14
log labour cost, lagged 0.55 ∗∗ 0.48 ∗∗ 0.14 0.28 ∗ -0.02 0.42 ∗∗ 0.20 0.18
constant -1.08 ∗∗ -0.37 0.25 0.16 0.20 -0.15 0.02 -0.08
long-run prod. elasticity 1.09 ∗∗ 1.01 ∗∗ 0.28 0.57 1.04 1.13 ∗∗ 1.16 ∗∗ 1.63 ∗∗
long-run wage elasticity -2.53 ∗∗ -1.56 ∗∗ 2.18 7.38 4.75 -0.75 1.59 0.90
Nob 574 1603 3303 3163 3680 4683 6145 5375
Mean of dep.var 4.81 4.40 4.26 4.21 4.10 3.97 3.98 3.97
R2 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.96
SEE 0.41 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.29 0.27 0.26
Overidentification test 1.80 ∗ 4.17 ∗∗ 2.64 ∗∗ 3.75 ∗∗ 5.84 ∗∗ 11.75 ∗∗ 9.05 ∗∗ 11.90 ∗∗
Change of production ≤ 0
log employment, lagged 0.86 ∗∗ 0.92 ∗∗ 0.95 ∗∗ 0.94 ∗∗ 0.91 ∗∗ 0.91 ∗∗ 0.93 ∗∗ 0.85 ∗∗
log production 0.68 ∗∗ 0.70 ∗∗ 0.76 ∗∗ 0.63 ∗∗ 0.94 ∗∗ 0.64 ∗∗ 0.50 ∗∗ 0.86 ∗∗
log production, lagged -0.58 ∗∗ -0.66 ∗∗ -0.71 ∗∗ -0.54 ∗∗ -0.86 ∗∗ -0.51 ∗∗ -0.39 ∗ -0.72 ∗∗
log labour cost -0.79 ∗∗ -0.10 -0.48 ∗∗ -0.69 ∗∗ -0.41 ∗∗ -0.68 ∗∗ -0.62 ∗∗ -1.30 ∗∗
log labour cost, lagged 0.78 ∗∗ 0.22 0.57 ∗∗ 0.69 ∗∗ 0.44 ∗∗ 0.57 ∗∗ 0.54 ∗∗ 1.17 ∗∗
constant 0.28 ∗ 0.26 0.12 -0.21 0.12 -0.31 ∗ -0.35 -0.10
long-run prod. elasticity 0.71 ∗∗ 0.60 ∗ 1.01 ∗∗ 1.50 ∗∗ 0.96 ∗∗ 1.45 ∗∗ 1.79 ∗ 1.00 ∗∗
long-run wage elasticity -0.08 1.46 1.82 -0.06 0.33 -1.18 -1.31 -0.87 ∗∗
Nob 3016 2723 3339 4726 5056 5362 4421 5392
Mean of dep.var 4.92 4.48 4.17 4.03 3.90 3.76 3.77 3.70
R2 0.94 0.90 0.92 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.92
SEE 0.29 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.36 0.31 0.29 0.36
Overidentification test 4.95 ∗∗ 4.71 ∗∗ 1.03 3.14 ∗∗ 1.58 7.11 ∗∗ 10.25 ∗∗ 5.68 ∗∗
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Table 6: Labour demand equations: base model, manufacturing
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
log employment, lagged 0.88 ∗∗ 0.83 ∗∗ 0.95 ∗∗ 0.96 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗ 0.97 ∗∗ 0.93 ∗∗ 0.94 ∗∗
log production 0.73 ∗∗ 0.85 ∗∗ 0.52 ∗∗ 0.74 ∗∗ 0.76 ∗∗ 0.45 ∗∗ 0.76 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗
log production, lagged -0.64 ∗∗ -0.70 ∗∗ -0.48 ∗∗ -0.69 ∗∗ -0.71 ∗∗ -0.41 ∗∗ -0.69 ∗∗ -0.92 ∗∗
log labour cost -0.82 ∗∗ -1.11 ∗∗ -0.61 ∗∗ -0.75 ∗∗ -0.62 ∗∗ -0.50 ∗∗ -0.66 ∗∗ -0.91 ∗∗
log labour cost, lagged 0.68 ∗∗ 0.77 ∗∗ 0.52 ∗∗ 0.68 ∗∗ 0.66 ∗∗ 0.53 ∗∗ 0.59 ∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗
constant 0.09 -0.27 ∗ -0.09 -0.16 ∗∗ -0.16 ∗∗ -0.03 -0.13 ∗ -0.06
long-run prod. elasticity 0.76 ∗∗ 0.91 ∗∗ 0.79 ∗∗ 1.02 ∗∗ 3.32 1.42 ∗ 1.06 ∗∗ 0.91 ∗∗
long-run wage elasticity -1.10 ∗ -1.99 ∗∗ -1.80 ∗ -1.77 ∗ 2.56 1.06 -0.93 ∗∗ -1.17 ∗
Nob 1175 1406 2172 2620 2882 3358 3591 3682
Mean of dep. variable 4.98 4.65 4.45 4.37 4.30 4.18 4.23 4.21
S.dev of dep. variable 1.25 1.25 1.24 1.25 1.25 1.27 1.23 1.22
R2 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95
SEE 0.30 0.32 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28
Overidentification test 3.72 ∗∗ 1.09 3.36 ∗∗ 2.61 ∗∗ 6.60 ∗∗ 5.66 ∗∗ 2.74 ∗∗ 4.94 ∗∗
Wald test for capital cost 4.68 0.15 3.69 2.61 12.02 ∗∗ 5.17 4.90 4.93
Wald test for lab=cap cost 21.96 ∗∗ 31.47 ∗∗ 25.60 ∗∗ 18.23 ∗∗ 44.89 ∗∗ 16.41 ∗∗ 12.45 ∗∗ 27.70 ∗∗
Wald test for sectors 11.83 11.40 16.57 ∗ 10.71 23.04 ∗∗ 14.27 ∗ 11.13 11.48
Wald test for diff’ed form 5.88 19.15 ∗∗ 5.49 5.88 32.70 ∗∗ 10.47 ∗ 31.92 ∗∗ 16.28 ∗∗
Wald test for quasy diff. 0.27 12.97 ∗∗ 3.32 2.34 32.68 ∗∗ 9.72 ∗∗ 6.10 ∗ 0.77
Break at qt > qt−1 13.05 ∗ 4.74 14.40 ∗ 19.48 ∗∗ 25.79 ∗∗ 17.15 ∗∗ 10.94 39.95 ∗∗
Break at foreign ownership 11.48 ∗ 2.71 9.86 8.36 21.93 ∗∗ 7.23 2.13 26.29 ∗∗
Break at majority for. own. 9.61 6.66 8.52 10.98 10.43 20.61 ∗∗ 4.69 9.64
Break at private own. 0.98 3.29 6.52 5.49 7.27 18.60 ∗∗ 3.89 4.47
Break at ‘other’ own. 8.28 5.22 2.12 5.11 13.66 ∗ 9.21 1.98 17.76 ∗∗
Break at state own. 8.61 3.45 4.42 3.69 11.28 ∗ 4.41 2.08 5.25
Break at small firms 7.86 3.97 4.68 14.30 ∗ 23.80 ∗∗ 15.76 ∗∗ 10.39 16.24 ∗∗
Break at med-sized firms 5.43 3.25 9.42 5.85 15.51 ∗∗ 13.18 ∗ 7.38 9.19
Break at large firms 3.88 5.03 13.12 ∗ 12.06 ∗ 20.96 ∗∗ 8.71 7.41 8.40
Change of production > 0
log employment, lagged 0.79 ∗∗ 0.86 ∗∗ 0.92 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗ 1.03 ∗∗ 1.00 ∗∗ 0.95 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗
log production 0.65 ∗∗ 0.72 ∗∗ 0.39 ∗∗ 0.39 ∗ 0.46 ∗∗ 0.36 ∗∗ 0.64 ∗∗ 0.96 ∗∗
log production, lagged -0.44 ∗ -0.56 ∗∗ -0.35 ∗∗ -0.37 ∗ -0.42 ∗∗ -0.35 ∗∗ -0.58 ∗∗ -0.92 ∗∗
log labour cost -0.92 ∗∗ -0.92 ∗∗ -0.59 ∗∗ -0.40 ∗ -0.39 ∗∗ -0.48 ∗∗ -0.49 ∗∗ -0.52 ∗
log labour cost, lagged 0.47 ∗ 0.60 ∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗ 0.37 ∗ 0.47 ∗∗ 0.51 ∗∗ 0.44 ∗∗ 0.44
constant -0.54 -0.49 ∗∗ 0.00 -0.07 -0.23 ∗ 0.00 -0.17 ∗ -0.29 ∗∗
long-run prod. elasticity 0.99 ∗∗ 1.13 ∗∗ 0.54 ∗∗ 1.07 -1.03 -17.78 1.21 ∗∗ 1.92
long-run wage elasticity -2.18 ∗ -2.27 ∗∗ -2.10 ∗∗ -1.58 -2.36 -48.07 -0.88 -3.67
Nob 278 713 1238 1324 1316 1705 2108 1810
Mean of dep.var 4.94 4.70 4.51 4.47 4.40 4.30 4.28 4.26
R2 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.96
SEE 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.24 0.25 0.25
Overidentification test 3.03 ∗∗ 1.92 ∗ 2.68 ∗∗ 3.02 ∗∗ 4.13 ∗∗ 5.77 ∗∗ 3.51 ∗∗ 7.29 ∗∗
Change of production ≤ 0
log employment, lagged 0.99 ∗∗ 0.91 ∗∗ 1.02 ∗∗ 0.96 ∗∗ 1.00 ∗∗ 0.94 ∗∗ 0.97 ∗∗ 0.88 ∗∗
log production 0.72 ∗∗ 0.73 ∗∗ 0.81 ∗∗ 0.72 ∗∗ 1.12 ∗∗ 0.68 ∗∗ 0.52 ∗∗ 0.63 ∗∗
log production, lagged -0.70 ∗∗ -0.66 ∗∗ -0.83 ∗∗ -0.67 ∗∗ -1.11 ∗∗ -0.61 ∗∗ -0.47 ∗∗ -0.52 ∗∗
log labour cost -0.72 ∗∗ -0.56 ∗∗ -0.42 -0.33 -0.58 ∗∗ -0.49 ∗ -0.77 ∗∗ -1.19 ∗∗
log labour cost, lagged 0.79 ∗∗ 0.43 ∗ 0.51 0.36 0.66 ∗∗ 0.54 ∗ 0.73 ∗∗ 1.10 ∗∗
constant 0.20 -0.01 0.13 0.00 0.19 0.04 -0.13 -0.06
long-run prod. elasticity 1.40 0.80 ∗∗ 0.79 1.23 3.23 1.15 ∗∗ 1.57 ∗ 0.95 ∗∗
long-run wage elasticity 4.96 -1.42 -3.54 0.54 22.82 0.72 -1.16 -0.67 ∗∗
Nob 897 693 934 1296 1566 1653 1483 1872
Mean of dep.var 5.00 4.60 4.36 4.26 4.21 4.05 4.15 4.15
R2 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.97
SEE 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.27 0.31 0.30 0.26 0.23
Overidentification test 1.90 ∗ 1.06 0.21 1.12 1.63 1.63 2.02 ∗ 5.80 ∗∗
23
Table 7: Labour demand equations: base model, engineering
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
log employment, lagged 0.95 ∗∗ 0.62 ∗∗ 0.88 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗ 0.87 ∗∗ 0.91 ∗∗ 1.00 ∗∗ 0.87 ∗∗
log production 0.73 ∗∗ 0.89 ∗ 0.76 ∗∗ 0.56 ∗∗ 0.78 ∗∗ 0.74 ∗ 0.59 ∗∗ 1.04 ∗∗
log production, lagged -0.65 ∗∗ -0.45 ∗ -0.64 ∗∗ -0.52 ∗∗ -0.62 ∗∗ -0.64 -0.57 ∗∗ -0.94 ∗∗
log labour cost -0.97 ∗ -1.32 -1.28 ∗∗ -0.59 ∗ -0.49 -0.90 -0.49 -1.12 ∗∗
log labour cost, lagged 0.84 ∗∗ 0.52 0.84 ∗∗ 0.64 ∗∗ 0.48 0.81 0.52 ∗ 1.01 ∗∗
constant -0.18 -1.11 -0.42 -0.08 -0.27 -0.20 -0.08 0.03
long-run prod. elasticity 1.51 1.15 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗ 1.45 1.26 ∗∗ 1.16 ∗∗ -7.66 0.74 ∗∗
long-run wage elasticity -2.50 -2.11 ∗∗ -3.47 2.39 -0.13 -0.92 -12.61 -0.80
Nob 384 451 758 895 978 1175 1281 1308
Mean of dep. variable 4.70 4.46 4.27 4.19 4.17 4.10 4.18 4.17
S.dev of dep. variable 1.18 1.20 1.23 1.25 1.24 1.24 1.23 1.24
R2 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.94
SEE 0.32 0.40 0.38 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.29 0.30
Overidentification test 0.37 0.26 0.39 1.01 2.83 ∗∗ 1.44 3.10 ∗∗ 3.52 ∗∗
Wald test for capital cost 0.40 0.79 2.89 0.62 3.88 1.41 2.43 1.76
Wald test for lab=cap cost 8.59 ∗ 2.76 6.41 ∗ 9.59 ∗∗ 13.48 ∗∗ 3.05 0.83 6.91 ∗
Wald test for sectors 0.14 3.49 2.56 0.29 1.58 2.09 0.12 0.03
Wald test for diff’ed form 1.89 5.23 4.34 1.69 16.17 ∗∗ 6.76 8.60 ∗ 11.18 ∗
Wald test for quasy diff. 1.37 5.71 4.25 1.49 10.17 ∗∗ 0.78 6.87 ∗ 0.69
Break at qt > qt−1 0.87 2.92 3.46 6.35 0.92 12.68 ∗ 1.43 6.43
Break at foreign ownership 1.82 5.06 2.35 4.44 4.70 14.99 ∗ 0.33 4.83
Break at majority for. own. 0.48 1.39 1.96 2.98 3.36 8.18 0.43 0.57
Break at private own. 0.00 0.55 2.98 3.68 0.47 1.01 3.39 4.68
Break at ‘other’ own. 1.79 4.78 4.59 5.84 4.16 10.10 3.80 13.54 ∗
Break at state own. 1.96 2.92 0.16 3.42 1.18 2.44 2.87 4.79
Break at small firms 2.22 5.90 0.84 2.82 4.44 7.08 2.14 9.51
Break at med-sized firms 2.15 3.16 5.98 2.38 10.26 1.92 0.30 6.91
Break at large firms 2.35 4.18 2.43 7.49 7.37 18.28 ∗∗ 3.32 3.96
Change of production > 0
log employment, lagged 1.05 ∗∗ 0.64 ∗∗ 1.00 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗ 0.99 ∗∗ 1.05 ∗∗ 1.09 ∗∗
log production 0.03 1.06 ∗ 0.20 0.49 ∗∗ 0.53 ∗∗ 0.70 ∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗ -1.29
log production, lagged -0.06 -0.57 -0.22 -0.47 ∗∗ -0.48 ∗∗ -0.63 ∗∗ -0.44 ∗∗ 1.26
log labour cost 0.36 -1.69 -0.08 -0.57 ∗∗ -0.11 -1.10 ∗∗ -0.08 1.55
log labour cost, lagged 0.57 0.63 0.15 0.53 ∗∗ 0.25 0.91 ∗∗ 0.15 -1.25
constant 0.90 -1.85 0.15 -0.12 -0.09 -0.54 ∗ -0.06 0.23
long-run prod. elasticity 0.54 1.39 ∗∗ 5.58 1.23 3.11 6.43 0.35 0.30
long-run wage elasticity -18.48 -2.99 ∗∗ -20.22 -2.10 8.72 -15.51 -1.63 -3.32
Nob 85 261 451 535 519 642 818 724
Mean of dep.var 4.58 4.50 4.37 4.33 4.33 4.30 4.27 4.28
R2 0.78 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.84
SEE 0.60 0.47 0.29 0.27 0.33 0.27 0.30 0.57
Overidentification test 0.47 0.17 0.72 1.49 2.97 ∗∗ 1.23 1.49 0.96
Change of production ≤ 0
log employment, lagged 0.88 ∗∗ 0.75 ∗∗ 1.10 ∗∗ 0.92 ∗∗ 0.90 ∗∗ 0.82 ∗∗ 0.99 ∗∗ 0.88 ∗∗
log production 0.79 ∗∗ 0.52 ∗ 0.56 ∗∗ 0.69 ∗∗ 0.96 ∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗ 0.67 ∗ 0.36
log production, lagged -0.65 ∗∗ -0.27 -0.65 ∗∗ -0.61 ∗∗ -0.82 ∗∗ -0.65 ∗ -0.63 -0.25
log labour cost -0.91 ∗ 0.03 -1.06 ∗∗ -0.27 -0.66 -0.54 ∗ -1.21 ∗ -1.50 ∗∗
log labour cost, lagged 0.72 ∗ -0.22 1.12 ∗∗ 0.46 0.64 ∗ 0.61 ∗ 1.18 ∗∗ 1.24 ∗∗
constant -0.11 -0.30 0.07 0.18 -0.20 0.02 -0.11 -0.24
long-run prod. elasticity 1.15 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗ 0.95 ∗ 1.52 ∗∗ 1.07 ∗∗ 3.41 0.96 ∗
long-run wage elasticity -1.51 -0.76 -0.62 2.33 -0.30 0.41 -2.90 -2.10
Nob 299 190 307 360 459 533 463 584
Mean of dep.var 4.73 4.40 4.12 3.98 4.00 3.85 4.00 4.04
R2 0.94 0.90 0.90 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.96
SEE 0.30 0.38 0.40 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.24
Overidentification test 0.24 0.53 0.11 0.32 0.90 0.72 1.34 1.53
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Table 8: Labour demand equations: augmented short-run model, all firms
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
diff of log production 0.56 ∗∗ 0.54 ∗∗ 0.47 ∗∗ 0.41 ∗∗ 0.33 ∗∗ 0.35 ∗∗ 0.29 ∗∗ 0.35 ∗∗
diff of log labour cost -0.80 ∗∗ -0.61 ∗∗ -0.55 ∗∗ -0.53 ∗∗ -0.37 ∗∗ -0.19 ∗∗ -0.16 ∗ -0.20 ∗∗
efficiency -0.06 0.22 ∗∗ 0.18 ∗∗ 0.35 ∗∗ 0.32 ∗∗ 0.27 ∗∗ 0.36 ∗∗ 0.28 ∗∗
owner: state 0.02 0.04 ∗∗ 0.00 0.00 -0.04 ∗∗ -0.04 ∗∗ -0.03 ∗ -0.02 ∗
owner: domestic private 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.03 ∗∗ -0.05 ∗∗ -0.04 ∗∗ -0.04 ∗∗
owner: foreign 0.07 ∗∗ 0.05 ∗∗ 0.03 ∗∗ 0.05 ∗∗ 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 ∗
small firm -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 ∗∗ -0.05 ∗∗ -0.02 ∗∗ -0.04 ∗∗ -0.04 ∗∗
large firm 0.05 ∗∗ -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 ∗
constant 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.08 ∗ 0.14 ∗∗ 0.13 ∗∗ 0.18 ∗∗ 0.13 ∗∗
Nob 2791 3876 6134 7349 8099 9328 9864 10027
Mean of dep. variable -0.21 -0.13 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.04
S.dev of dep. variable 0.41 0.44 0.37 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.32
R2 0.62 0.62 0.53 0.48 0.39 0.32 0.29 0.34
SEE 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.26
Overidentification test 8.72 ∗∗ 3.99 ∗∗ 5.75 ∗∗ 5.23 ∗∗ 4.40 ∗∗ 3.64 ∗∗ 2.83 ∗∗ 7.90 ∗∗
Wald test for sectors 43.16 ∗∗ 39.69 ∗∗ 60.39 ∗∗ 39.67 ∗∗ 22.80 ∗∗ 10.60 12.75 11.01
Break at qt > qt−1 38.08 ∗∗ 0.16 1.10 15.89 ∗∗ 7.90 ∗ 4.81 0.04 11.50 ∗∗
Table 9: Labour demand equations: augmented short-run model, manufacturing
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
diff of log production 0.63 ∗∗ 0.59 ∗∗ 0.54 ∗∗ 0.42 ∗∗ 0.40 ∗∗ 0.47 ∗∗ 0.38 ∗∗ 0.45 ∗∗
diff of log labour cost -0.78 ∗∗ -0.67 ∗∗ -0.60 ∗∗ -0.39 ∗∗ -0.54 ∗∗ -0.48 ∗∗ -0.20 -0.30 ∗∗
efficiency -0.09 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.27 ∗∗ 0.19 0.19 0.01
owner: state -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 ∗ -0.03 ∗ -0.02 0.02 -0.04
owner: domestic private 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 ∗∗ -0.03 ∗∗ -0.04 ∗∗ -0.05 ∗∗
owner: foreign 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.03 ∗ 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
small firm -0.08 ∗∗ -0.01 -0.02 ∗ -0.01 -0.04 ∗∗ -0.04 ∗∗ -0.04 ∗∗ -0.03 ∗∗
large firm 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 ∗ 0.01 -0.02
constant 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.12 ∗∗ 0.11 ∗ 0.12 ∗ 0.03
Nob 887 1300 2059 2494 2753 3215 3455 3541
Mean of dep. variable -0.16 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.02
S.dev of dep. variable 0.41 0.37 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.29 0.28
R2 0.64 0.61 0.52 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.34 0.43
SEE 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.22
Overidentification test 3.80 ∗∗ 1.39 2.63 ∗∗ 1.87 ∗ 5.07 ∗∗ 1.72 ∗ 1.61 3.48 ∗∗
Wald test for sectors 14.69 ∗ 5.16 10.43 6.14 28.12 ∗∗ 9.43 22.24 ∗∗ 11.10
Break at qt > qt−1 6.81 ∗ 0.74 1.39 0.29 7.76 ∗ 2.48 4.11 7.35 ∗
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Table 10: Labour demand equations: augmented short-run model, engineering
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
diff of log production 0.62 ∗∗ 0.51 ∗∗ 0.45 ∗∗ 0.37 ∗∗ 0.49 ∗∗ 0.32 ∗∗ 0.22 ∗∗ 0.50 ∗∗
diff of log labour cost -0.87 ∗∗ -0.52 ∗∗ -0.54 ∗∗ -0.54 ∗∗ -0.66 ∗∗ -0.35 ∗∗ 0.40 -0.55 ∗∗
efficiency -0.29 -0.08 0.24 0.62 ∗ 0.19 0.56 ∗ 0.36 0.00
owner: state 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.14 ∗ -0.04
owner: domestic private 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 ∗ -0.07 ∗∗ -0.08 ∗∗
owner: foreign 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.06 ∗∗ 0.04 ∗ 0.01 -0.02
small firm -0.09 ∗∗ -0.03 -0.06 ∗∗ -0.02 -0.04 ∗∗ -0.05 ∗∗ -0.05 ∗ -0.05 ∗∗
large firm 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.02
constant -0.09 -0.06 0.12 0.19 0.08 0.26 ∗∗ 0.16 0.07
Nob 291 422 721 846 937 1142 1237 1273
Mean of dep. variable -0.17 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.02
S.dev of dep. variable 0.39 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.32
R2 0.63 0.47 0.49 0.43 0.58 0.46 0.10 0.53
SEE 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.22
Overidentification test 2.05 ∗∗ 0.54 0.90 0.52 2.21 ∗∗ 0.67 0.30 3.58 ∗∗
Wald test for sectors 1.12 0.93 2.58 3.19 1.54 8.02 ∗∗ 3.26 0.62
Break at qt > qt−1 3.75 3.42 5.89 2.17 9.52 ∗∗ 1.11 0.39 10.63 ∗∗
Table 11: Labour demand equations: augmented short-run model, chemical industry
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
diff of log production 0.82 ∗∗ 0.50 ∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗ 0.47 ∗∗ 0.36 ∗∗ 0.29 ∗ 0.65 ∗∗ 0.52 ∗∗
diff of log labour cost -0.73 ∗∗ -0.56 ∗∗ -0.83 ∗∗ -0.45 ∗∗ -0.55 -0.19 -0.73 ∗ -0.18
efficiency -0.04 0.21 0.19 0.01 0.30 0.31 0.14 -0.13
owner: state 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.42 -0.09
owner: domestic private 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
owner: foreign 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.13 ∗∗ 0.03 0.05 ∗ -0.04 0.08 ∗∗
small firm 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
large firm 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.00
constant 0.14 0.12 0.09 -0.10 0.14 0.13 0.11 -0.08
Nob 77 133 196 235 252 293 328 337
Mean of dep. variable -0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.00
S.dev of dep. variable 0.42 0.37 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.38 0.26
R2 0.70 0.63 0.51 0.44 0.41 0.27 0.75 0.52
SEE 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.18
Overidentification test 0.56 0.63 0.54 0.56 0.69 0.57 0.94 0.41
Wald test for sectors 1.61 1.02 0.48 0.86 2.20 2.17 1.53 2.30
Break at qt > qt−1 2.94 0.59 1.49 1.84 0.30 4.77 2.13 0.86
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Table 12: Wage equations
Variable 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Gender 0.244 ∗∗ 0.238 ∗∗ 0.219 ∗∗ 0.224 ∗∗ 0.216 ∗∗ 0.210 ∗∗ 0.217 ∗∗
Experience/100 2.537 ∗∗ 2.369 ∗∗ 2.258 ∗∗ 2.149 ∗∗ 2.141 ∗∗ 1.920 ∗∗ 2.073 ∗∗
Exp2/10000 -3.590 ∗∗ -3.150 ∗∗ -3.050 ∗∗ -2.841 ∗∗ -2.878 ∗∗ -2.631 ∗∗ -3.141 ∗∗
Education
Max. 8 classes 0.112 ∗∗ 0.081 ∗∗ 0.051 ∗∗ 0.129 ∗∗ 0.171 ∗∗ 0.145 ∗∗ 0.114 ∗∗
Vocational 0.238 ∗∗ 0.206 ∗∗ 0.158 ∗∗ 0.255 ∗∗ 0.286 ∗∗ 0.258 ∗∗ 0.229 ∗∗
Secondary 0.348 ∗∗ 0.311 ∗∗ 0.256 ∗∗ 0.343 ∗∗ 0.384 ∗∗ 0.367 ∗∗ 0.336 ∗∗
Tertiary 0.756 ∗∗ 0.692 ∗∗ 0.645 ∗∗ 0.765 ∗∗ 0.824 ∗∗ 0.824 ∗∗ 0.813 ∗∗
Position
Manager 0.670 ∗∗ 0.790 ∗∗ 0.691 ∗∗ 0.810 ∗∗ 0.776 ∗∗ 0.791 ∗∗ 0.747 ∗∗
Professional 0.227 ∗∗ 0.232 ∗∗ 0.198 ∗∗ 0.244 ∗∗ 0.252 ∗∗ 0.240 ∗∗ 0.262 ∗∗
Location
Budapest 0.193 ∗∗ 0.239 ∗∗ 0.232 ∗∗ 0.209 ∗∗ 0.224 ∗∗ 0.242 ∗∗ 0.226 ∗∗
Other town 0.022 ∗∗ 0.066 ∗∗ 0.067 ∗∗ 0.070 ∗∗ 0.064 ∗∗ 0.062 ∗∗ 0.054 ∗∗
Constant 9.235 ∗∗ 9.593 ∗∗ 10.428 ∗∗ 9.868 ∗∗ 10.372 ∗∗ 10.149 ∗∗ 10.182 ∗∗
Nace 2 sect. (F) 253.090 ∗∗ 255.800 ∗∗ 206.000 ∗∗ 201.970 ∗∗ 188.800 ∗∗ 179.100 ∗∗ 191.580 ∗∗
Number of obs 99043 150680 152689 98502 91226 103264 104477
R2 0.479 0.502 0.473 0.486 0.493 0.486 0.498
RMSE 0.384 0.402 0.403 0.414 0.440 0.444 0.449
Legend: All equations were estimated by OLS with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. One
asterisk (*) indicates significance at 5% level, while two asterisks (**) indicate it at 1%. Gender: male=1,
female=0; experience is measured in years, all other variables are dummies. Sectoral dummies are tested as
additional regressors by joint F -test. RMSE: root mean squared error.
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Table 13: Production functions with skill-specific labour
Variable 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
All firms
log(L) 1.15 ∗∗ 1.12 ∗∗ 1.05 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗ 0.96 ∗∗ 0.94 ∗∗
log(K) 0.10 ∗ 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.17 ∗∗ 0.12 0.10 ∗
Dlog(L) 1.10 ∗∗ 0.69 ∗ 1.37 ∗ 1.00 ∗ 1.04 ∗ 1.69 1.21 ∗
log(Ls/Lu) 0.31 ∗∗ 0.57 ∗∗ 0.69 ∗∗ 0.57 ∗∗ 0.70 ∗∗ 0.86 ∗∗ 0.83 ∗∗
log(w∗s) 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.09 ∗ 0.10 ∗ 0.09 ∗ 0.06
log(w∗u) 0.06 0.14 ∗∗ 0.03 0.10 ∗ 0.04 0.04 0.04
owner: state -0.04 -0.29 ∗ -0.26 ∗ -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 0.13
owner: domestic private -0.07 -0.11 -0.06 -0.09 -0.13 -0.25 ∗ -0.07
owner: foreign 0.49 ∗∗ 0.29 ∗ 0.14 0.28 ∗ 0.12 0.09 0.01
Constant -1.57 ∗∗ -0.36 -0.23 0.18 0.36 0.11 0.15
Nob 177 250 326 317 233 363 359
Mean of dep.var 5.63 5.72 5.80 5.67 5.71 5.70 5.58
S.dev of dep.var 1.12 1.20 1.10 1.23 1.38 1.41 1.53
R2 0.82 0.78 0.68 0.80 0.79 0.76 0.75
SEE 0.50 0.59 0.69 0.59 0.68 0.74 0.81
Overidentification test 1.46 1.44 1.44 1.93 ∗ 1.75 ∗ 3.92 ∗∗ 2.46 ∗∗
Manufacturing
log(L) 0.89 ∗∗ 0.99 ∗∗ 0.92 ∗∗ 0.83 ∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗ 0.91 ∗∗ 0.83 ∗∗
log(K) 0.15 ∗∗ 0.04 0.10 0.17 ∗∗ 0.17 ∗ 0.18 ∗ 0.16 ∗∗
Dlog(L) 0.74 ∗∗ 0.43 1.29 0.74 1.56 ∗∗ 0.97 0.87
log(Ls/Lu) 0.24 ∗∗ 0.54 ∗∗ 0.63 ∗∗ 0.42 ∗∗ 0.56 ∗∗ 0.82 ∗∗ 0.65 ∗∗
log(w∗s) 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 ∗ 0.16 ∗∗ 0.09 0.02
log(w∗u) 0.09 ∗∗ 0.23 ∗∗ 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.10 ∗
owner: state 0.03 -0.42 ∗∗ -0.45 ∗∗ -0.13 -0.30 0.13 -0.02
owner: domestic private -0.06 -0.14 -0.02 -0.09 -0.07 -0.30 ∗ -0.09
owner: foreign 0.42 ∗∗ 0.32 ∗ 0.16 0.33 ∗∗ 0.15 0.01 0.08
Constant -0.39 0.26 0.22 0.40 0.39 0.06 0.33
Nob 119 177 220 207 171 265 269
Mean of dep.var 5.77 5.74 5.89 5.87 5.81 5.79 5.61
S.dev of dep.var 1.00 1.11 1.03 1.13 1.32 1.36 1.48
R2 0.81 0.73 0.64 0.78 0.79 0.74 0.74
SEE 0.46 0.60 0.69 0.56 0.65 0.75 0.78
Overidentification test 1.16 1.39 1.47 2.33 ∗∗ 2.00 ∗ 3.56 ∗∗ 2.95 ∗∗
Legend: All equations were estimated by instrumental variables method with heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors. One asterisk (*) indicates significance at 5% level, while two asterisks (**) indicate it at 1%.
w∗s stands for the opportunity wage of skilled employees, while w∗u for that of unskilled ones. Nob: number
of observations. SEE: Standard error of estimation.
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Table 14: Dynamic production functions with slack, all firms
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
log(Qt−1) 0.78 ∗∗ 0.82 ∗∗ 0.86 ∗∗ 0.90 ∗∗ 0.91 ∗∗ 0.88 ∗∗ 0.90 ∗∗ 0.90 ∗∗
log(Lt) 1.03 ∗∗ 1.00 ∗∗ 0.93 ∗∗ 0.89 ∗∗ 0.83 ∗∗ 0.83 ∗∗ 0.81 ∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗
log(Lt−1) -0.82 ∗∗ -0.86 ∗∗ -0.82 ∗∗ -0.81 ∗∗ -0.78 ∗∗ -0.74 ∗∗ -0.74 ∗∗ -0.76 ∗∗
log(Kt) 0.07 ∗∗ 0.13 ∗∗ 0.14 ∗∗ 0.11 ∗∗ 0.12 ∗∗ 0.12 ∗∗ 0.09 ∗∗ 0.09 ∗∗
log(Kt−1) -0.07 ∗∗ -0.10 ∗∗ -0.12 ∗∗ -0.08 ∗∗ -0.10 ∗∗ -0.09 ∗∗ -0.07 ∗∗ -0.06 ∗∗
log(wt) 0.94 ∗∗ 0.88 ∗∗ 0.82 ∗∗ 0.69 ∗∗ 0.67 ∗∗ 0.70 ∗∗ 0.66 ∗∗ 0.65 ∗∗
log(wt−1) -0.64 ∗∗ -0.68 ∗∗ -0.66 ∗∗ -0.61 ∗∗ -0.61 ∗∗ -0.62 ∗∗ -0.56 ∗∗ -0.55 ∗∗
constant 0.29 ∗∗ 0.31 ∗∗ 0.31 ∗∗ 0.17 ∗∗ 0.22 ∗∗ 0.15 ∗∗ 0.20 ∗∗ 0.16 ∗∗
Long-run coefficients
α 0.95 ∗∗ 0.81 ∗∗ 0.79 ∗∗ 0.81 ∗∗ 0.61 ∗∗ 0.78 ∗∗ 0.70 ∗∗ 0.76 ∗∗
β -0.01 0.13 ∗∗ 0.13 ∗∗ 0.28 ∗∗ 0.26 ∗∗ 0.27 ∗∗ 0.26 ∗∗ 0.26 ∗∗
ω 1.38 ∗∗ 1.10 ∗∗ 1.12 ∗∗ 0.81 ∗∗ 0.71 ∗∗ 0.67 ∗∗ 0.95 ∗∗ 0.94 ∗∗
Slack coefficients
αs 0.08 0.20 ∗∗ 0.14 0.07 0.22 ∗ 0.05 0.11 0.08
βs 0.08 ∗ 0.00 0.01 -0.17 ∗∗ -0.14 ∗∗ -0.15 ∗∗ -0.17 ∗∗ -0.17 ∗∗
ωs -0.44 ∗∗ -0.22 ∗ -0.30 ∗∗ -0.12 -0.03 0.03 -0.30 ∗∗ -0.29 ∗∗
Nob 3807 4372 5357 6016 6298 6990 7106 6981
Mean of dep.var 4.55 4.32 4.39 4.36 4.32 4.29 4.43 4.42
S.dev of dep.var 1.39 1.42 1.47 1.54 1.56 1.58 1.55 1.57
R2 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95
SEE 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.33
Reset test 30.17 ∗∗ 4.44 ∗ 4.29 ∗ 2.12 6.69 ∗ 23.35 ∗∗ 2.66 20.99 ∗∗
Legend to all dynamic production functions with slack: All equations were estimated by OLS
with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. One asterisk (*) indicates significance at 5% level, while
two asterisks (**) indicate it at 1%. α, β and ω are employment, capital and wages elasticities, while αs, βs
and ωs are the respective slack coefficients. Nob: number of observations. SEE: Standard error of estimation.
Reset: Ramsey’s Reset test for specification errors, using squared fitted values.
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Table 15: Dynamic production functions with slack, manufacturing
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
log(Qt−1) 0.77 ∗∗ 0.83 ∗∗ 0.88 ∗∗ 0.89 ∗∗ 0.92 ∗∗ 0.87 ∗∗ 0.87 ∗∗ 0.90 ∗∗
log(Lt) 1.04 ∗∗ 1.07 ∗∗ 0.95 ∗∗ 0.94 ∗∗ 0.90 ∗∗ 0.86 ∗∗ 0.81 ∗∗ 0.83 ∗∗
log(Lt−1) -0.86 ∗∗ -0.94 ∗∗ -0.87 ∗∗ -0.86 ∗∗ -0.86 ∗∗ -0.79 ∗∗ -0.75 ∗∗ -0.77 ∗∗
log(Kt) 0.08 ∗∗ 0.10 ∗∗ 0.14 ∗∗ 0.10 ∗∗ 0.09 ∗∗ 0.11 ∗∗ 0.09 ∗∗ 0.07 ∗∗
log(Kt−1) -0.05 ∗ -0.07 ∗∗ -0.10 ∗∗ -0.06 ∗∗ -0.06 ∗∗ -0.05 ∗ -0.03 -0.03
log(wt) 1.02 ∗∗ 0.92 ∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗ 0.74 ∗∗ 0.75 ∗∗ 0.74 ∗∗ 0.72 ∗∗ 0.65 ∗∗
log(wt−1) -0.69 ∗∗ -0.71 ∗∗ -0.72 ∗∗ -0.63 ∗∗ -0.70 ∗∗ -0.65 ∗∗ -0.61 ∗∗ -0.54 ∗∗
constant 0.41 ∗∗ 0.31 ∗∗ 0.27 ∗∗ 0.27 ∗∗ 0.22 ∗∗ 0.23 ∗∗ 0.32 ∗∗ 0.18 ∗∗
Long-run coefficients
α 0.79 ∗∗ 0.77 ∗∗ 0.62 ∗∗ 0.67 ∗∗ 0.40 ∗∗ 0.54 ∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗ 0.62 ∗∗
β 0.10 ∗ 0.18 ∗∗ 0.32 ∗∗ 0.34 ∗∗ 0.42 ∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗ 0.44 ∗∗ 0.38 ∗∗
ω 1.45 ∗∗ 1.25 ∗∗ 0.99 ∗∗ 1.03 ∗∗ 0.63 ∗∗ 0.67 ∗∗ 0.85 ∗∗ 1.00 ∗∗
Slack coefficients
αs 0.24 ∗∗ 0.30 ∗∗ 0.32 ∗∗ 0.26 ∗∗ 0.50 ∗∗ 0.32 ∗∗ 0.38 ∗∗ 0.21 ∗
βs -0.03 -0.08 -0.19 ∗∗ -0.24 ∗∗ -0.33 ∗∗ -0.32 ∗∗ -0.35 ∗∗ -0.31 ∗∗
ωs -0.43 ∗∗ -0.33 ∗∗ -0.15 -0.29 ∗ 0.12 0.07 -0.13 -0.35 ∗∗
Nob 1906 2305 2886 3276 3447 3941 4044 4015
Mean of dep.var 4.56 4.43 4.52 4.53 4.50 4.45 4.58 4.59
S.dev of dep.var 1.56 1.54 1.59 1.64 1.66 1.67 1.64 1.67
R2 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97
SEE 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.30
Reset test 17.85 ∗∗ 4.60 ∗ 4.94 ∗ 5.90 ∗ 1.35 31.80 ∗∗ 3.46 25.08 ∗∗
Table 16: Dynamic production functions with slack, engineering
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
log(Qt−1) 0.75 ∗∗ 0.77 ∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗ 0.86 ∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗ 0.87 ∗∗ 0.86 ∗∗ 0.85 ∗∗
log(Lt) 1.11 ∗∗ 0.97 ∗∗ 0.83 ∗∗ 0.94 ∗∗ 0.92 ∗∗ 0.89 ∗∗ 0.75 ∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗
log(Lt−1) -0.86 ∗∗ -0.82 ∗∗ -0.71 ∗∗ -0.85 ∗∗ -0.84 ∗∗ -0.78 ∗∗ -0.69 ∗∗ -0.72 ∗∗
log(Kt) 0.08 0.15 ∗∗ 0.13 ∗∗ 0.12 ∗∗ 0.15 ∗∗ 0.08 ∗ 0.09 ∗∗ 0.03
log(Kt−1) -0.10 ∗ -0.09 ∗ -0.11 ∗∗ -0.07 ∗∗ -0.10 ∗∗ -0.05 -0.03 0.02
log(wt) 1.02 ∗∗ 0.91 ∗∗ 0.85 ∗∗ 0.75 ∗∗ 0.75 ∗∗ 0.85 ∗∗ 0.73 ∗∗ 0.76 ∗∗
log(wt−1) -0.66 ∗∗ -0.62 ∗∗ -0.68 ∗∗ -0.63 ∗∗ -0.63 ∗∗ -0.72 ∗∗ -0.64 ∗∗ -0.62 ∗∗
constant 0.39 ∗∗ 0.54 ∗∗ 0.36 ∗∗ 0.31 ∗∗ 0.41 ∗∗ 0.21 ∗ 0.33 ∗∗ 0.23 ∗∗
Long-run coefficients
α 0.99 ∗∗ 0.63 ∗∗ 0.71 ∗∗ 0.62 ∗∗ 0.52 ∗∗ 0.79 ∗∗ 0.45 ∗∗ 0.74 ∗∗
β -0.10 0.25 ∗∗ 0.18 ∗ 0.37 ∗∗ 0.29 ∗∗ 0.25 ∗∗ 0.46 ∗∗ 0.30 ∗∗
ω 1.41 ∗∗ 1.27 ∗∗ 1.01 ∗∗ 0.82 ∗∗ 0.78 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗ 0.67 ∗∗ 0.92 ∗∗
Slack coefficients
αs 0.13 0.34 ∗∗ 0.12 0.31 ∗∗ 0.40 ∗∗ 0.09 0.31 ∗ 0.09
βs 0.18 ∗ -0.10 -0.04 -0.25 ∗∗ -0.14 ∗ -0.17 ∗ -0.37 ∗∗ -0.27 ∗∗
ωs -0.39 -0.35 ∗∗ -0.16 -0.07 -0.03 -0.13 0.06 -0.16
Nob 641 784 1012 1146 1201 1418 1444 1427
Mean of dep.var 4.33 4.34 4.43 4.44 4.48 4.46 4.66 4.74
S.dev of dep.var 1.40 1.39 1.47 1.54 1.59 1.64 1.62 1.65
R2 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.97
SEE 0.46 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.31
Reset test 3.55 9.19 ∗∗ 14.08 ∗∗ 0.32 0.00 11.06 ∗∗ 1.84 39.55 ∗∗
30
